Authors like Paschalis Kitromilides and Mark Mazower have demonstrated that this impression is a result of certain narratives that were subsequently created, but were actually designed many decades or many centuries after the periods that they allegedly dealt with. Those narratives were created through cultural pol- icies of nascent ethno-national states and were then projected onto the past. By ana- lysing three Orthodox authors he endeavoured to sketch what could have been the Balkan or Orthodox mentality of that age.
Following their works he uncovers an Orthodox symbolic world of the 18thcentury in which there are at least three shared characteristics: 1. It was not translated into English. However, The Slavonic and East European Review published several articles from his collected studies that are related to his main book. Makovich 2. Presence of the supernatural in daily life that is integrated in everyday experience; 3. People like The- odor Kavalliotis who compiled a Romaic-Vlach-Albanian glos- sary in , or Daniel of Moschopolis who prepared a quad- rilingual dictionary of Romaic-Vlach-Bulgarian-Albanian, and published it in , were Vlachs by ethnic origins but Roma- ic by culture.
The author concludes that his intellectual heroes from the 18th centuries who shared the Romaic identity would not understand what happened in the period after they wrote. I — I II Many events of the 17th and 18th centuries or even from earli- er periods were seen through the lens of nationalist historiogra- phies of the 19th century. In efforts to bring them back to surface the author has demonstrated an excellent ability to fuse the find- ings of British and French historiographies, and in this sense his effort resembles the one made by Traian Stoianovich although they reached somewhat different results in certain aspects.
This identity survived not only among ethnic Greeks but also in isolated zones inhabited by the Orthodox population throughout the Balkans. Such was the case with the village Ar- vanasi near Veliko Trnovo. IV Knopf, An expanded version of this book was published in Idem, Balkan Worlds. Sharpe, Makovich a manuscript in — What kind of identities does this manuscript reveal?
He has been Bulgarianised and called Dimitrius Popsymeonov by Bulgarian scholars and Hellenised and dubbed a Hellene by Hellenic scholars. However, the author convincingly shows that in this specific village the Romaic iden- tity survived till the end of the 19th century. However, nationalism affected even the Great Church.
By the beginning of the 20th cen- tury a mere change of ethnicity of monks in certain areas could lead to the change of ethnicity of the population. IV 25— VII Serbs immediately began to be Russified without any encour- agement of official Sankt-Petersburg. This policy was conducted by the new administrator of the Dechani Monastery, hyeromonk Arsenius who was supported in this action by Tuholka, the Rus- sian Consul in Prizren.
This was, however, not an imposed pol- icy nor was there any particular Russian plan in this sense. It was the Serbs of Metohia themselves who demonstrated their inclination to adopt the Russian identity, and Russian monks accepted this readily and encouraged it. It had a huge impact on local Serbs. Even the villagers do not want to mention Serbs or Serbia but rather publicly claim that they are Russians. This disgrace was brought to us by the Russian monks in Dechani, by Tuholka in Prizren and by our own criminal neg- ligence.
Consequently, the Russian party quickly disappeared. Following the logic of the studies in An Orthodox Common- wealth one must suppose that Russian monks from the 18th cen- tury would never have attempted anything similar as their suc- cessors more than a century later. They would have been content to be in touch with fellow Orthodox Christians and their ethnic- ity would have been of secondary importance to them.
Russian monks from the beginning of the 20th century, however, came to Metohia not only as Orthodox missionaries, they also came as persons imbued with a specific national identity, and they want- ed to offer that identity as well to their parishioners.
Makovich Weak foundations of national continuity There is another point that Prof. Kitromilides raises in this book. It is the question of false continuity in constructing national narratives. In nationalism studies it has been shown many times that a single scholar was able to change the course of national aspirations and national self-identification of a cer- tain ethnic group. One such scholar was Konstantinos Con- stantine Paparrigopoulos.
He wrote the very influential Istoria tou Ellinikou ethnous History of the Hellenic Nation in five volumes in — Early Hellenic patriots like Adaman- tios Koraes wanted to promote the Hellenic component over the Romaic Roman component. The contempt for Byzantium present among French, English and other Enlightenment fig- ures only strengthened the focus of Hellenic patriots on ancient Hellas.
Paparrigopoulos was the first who was able to fuse the two streams: one representing the grandeur of classical Hel- lenism and the other epitomised by the Mediaeval Eastern Ro- man Empire. He did it by nationalising Byzantium, which in his interpretation became another expression of Hellenism. By dedicating three of the five volumes of his history to Byzan- tium he made a particular effort to establish continuity between the Hellas of Pericles, the Hellenism of Alexander the Great, Christian Hellenism, the Hellenism of Byzantium and the mod- ern Hellenic Kingdom.
Nicolae Iorga with his ten-volume History of the Romanians, and Vasi- li Zlatarski with his focus on mediaeval Bulgaria made similar efforts for Romanians and Bulgarians. The way that all three of these nations understand their continuity today owes a great deal to the three above mentioned historians. This book has a manifold importance for several disciplines, and I will single out several fields that may greatly benefit from consulting essays collected in this book.
These fields are: 1. Neo-Hellenic studies, 2. History of the modern Balkans, 3. Nationalism studies, and 4. Analysis of relations between Orthodoxy and modernism. Therefore it is indeed a great privilege to have this book available in Serbian translation. It is naturally a great pleasure to open this academic series of lecturers and book-launches with such a distinguished guest as Professor Kitromilides.
Let me just add a few words. First to thank our publisher for undertaking the expense to publish the book in Serbian, our ed- itor for his very conscientious and careful editorial work and for the many e-mails we exchanged, the translator for all the work she has done. I want to especially thank Slobodan, for the orig- inal idea, and to express my appreciation to all of you for the generosity and attention with which you have read the book.
Besides thanking you, I would only wish to say a few words about the motivation that went into the writing of the several articles which made up the book. If you look at the original pub- lication dates of the articles in the collection you will notice that they are much closer together than the articles that went into the making of the earlier Variorum collection of my articles, the one published in , which had a much broader range of original publication dates1.
Now, the third collection of my articles, that I had prepared just before the Variorum series was closed down, which is made up of my studies of the history of Cyprus and the Cyprus Question, had remained in limbo. Kitromilides The collection we are discussing here tonight is much more focused in terms of the dates of original publication.
There is some explanation to this. The articles were written at a period in which I was deeply concerned about two sets of arguments and misconceptions which I was very upset by. One misconcep- tion was the identification of Orthodoxy with nationalism. The mids was the period of the wars in Yugoslavia, which did a great deal to solidify this misunderstanding, a misconception that assumed the complete identification of Orthodoxy with na- tionalism. And of course, and I am saying this with great regret, the Orthodox Church in this embattled area at the time did all it could to confirm this identification.
Politics in Greece at the time over the Macedonian issue in the s is another case in point. Again the Orthodox Church appeared as the main champion of nationalism. In fact impor- tant members of the hierarchy of the Church of Greece making sermons against a poor neighboring people who wanted a name for themselves, contributed to the impression of the total iden- tification of Orthodoxy with nationalism.
I grew up in Cyprus, where the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus, for reasons having to do with local political conflicts and antagonisms, spearheaded the nationalist movement that eventually destroyed the Island. My concern matured through my studies in the history of ideas. I came to appreciate that that was a terrible, terrible dis- service to Christianity, especially to the moral teaching of Chris- tianity and to the Orthodox tradition itself, identifying that tra- dition with a secular ideology which does not have any place for the value of the individual person.
It uses all of that only to promote the exigencies and fantasies of national interest and national greatness. And that was and is morally very offensive. To raise some pertinent questions over all these issues was my original motivation. There are some biographical elements that I may refer to also. I had never visited the countries behind the Iron Curtain before the collapse of communism in — He invited me to that conference.
On the last day they took us on a tour of the Orthodox monuments of Bucharest. The most important of these monuments is the Stavropoleos Church in the centre of Bucharest. Hristos anesti hymn in the church. Some time later another very great Romanian scholar, who was very dear to me, Cornelia Papacostea-Danielopolu, one of the senior researchers of the Institute, made a remark that in a way enhanced my own self-awareness as a scholar of Southeast- ern Europe.
She was a lady of Vlach origin, from a Vlach family form North-Western Greece who had moved to Bucharest in the nineteenth century. They represented a kind of survivors of the Vlach network that had provided unity to Balkan society from the Aegean to Central Europe in the 18th century through their commercial and cultural activities.
And you could see the last remnants of that phenomenon in Romanian society at the end of the 20th century. This lady, Cornelia Papacostea, was the daughter of another great Romanian scholar, Victor Papacostea, who had been di- rector of the Romanian Institute of South East European Stud- ies before he was put to jail by the communist regime. She had worked as a private typist to keep her mother and father alive before she was employed by the Institute after the collapse of communism.
We met for the first time during that early visit to Bucharest. I was considerably younger than she was. In that way, living that moment that she could perceive in that light, she suggested to me that what I was doing was in fact 41 Paschalis M. Kitromilides a continuation of a very long tradition, to which I feel I belong.
It was at that time that I was working on these articles. So, they very much express the kind of self-awareness and self-con- sciousness that was developed in my mind by trying to excavate, as you very nicely put it, that part of the common experience of people in the Balkans which has been buried by the consolida- tion of nation-states in the 19th century and then by the contin- uation of the mentality of the nation-state under communism.
She was referring to the confluence of two currents of authoritarianism that involved a terrible hu- man cost for the people living under those regimes. So, in the collection just translated into Serbian I was trying to understand all of this and to form my judgment through a critical reassessment of conventional understandings of cultural phenomena and ideological expressions, which were connected with national liberation and nation-building in our countries, especially in countries like Serbia and Greece.
My original motivation was to deal critically with the iden- tification of Orthodoxy with nationalism and also to argue against that other misconception, which is discussed in some of the articles, about the incompatibility of Orthodoxy with liberal democracy.
You hear that repeated by journalists, and by po- litical scientists, and by anthropologists and so forth, who do not understand first the phenomena of religion, and who lack knowledge of the intellectual traditions of all our countries and especially they forget the role of the state. What we see in fact has to do with the failures of the Orthodox tradition in the mod- ern world as essentially the results of the subjection of religion to politics, and the uses to which the national states have put the Orthodox tradition in their particular societies.
This is what has led to various false identifications, including the impression that Orthodox Christianity is incompatible with liberal democracy. The answer is complex but to single out only Orthodoxy as incompatible with liberty is completely mistaken and certainly unfair.
My effort in most of my recent work has been somehow not necessarily to respond or clear out but at least record and prob- lematize all these misconceptions. I am in that sense very glad and grateful for this Serbian incarnation of my book. When you, Slobodan, first decided to suggest to our publisher the translation of this work, I won- dered why this book and not another one like the book on the Greek Enlightenment, which I consider my most representative work2.
I would think that the more representative work on the Enlightenment and Greek culture, which has been translated in Russian and Romanian, could bring my ideas more effectively to the Serbian readership. But now I can understand why, and I am very pleased and proud that we have the Serbian translation of the Orthodox Commonwealth. So, thank you very much. It is also suggested, on the basis of the evidence discussed, that as a moral doctrine, nationalism remains dubious and can be a de- structive ideology.
One is the question in the title of the meeting to which the paper was originally presented: Are we in sight of the end of the nation-state? The second question is announced by the title of this essay: How can we judge the relevance or ir- relevance of nationalism for understanding the contemporary world? There is a third, more historically oriented, question that is in a way subsumed in the other two, and this raises the issue 1 The paper was originally published in: International Journal of Poli- tics, Culture, and Society, Vol.
We thank the author for his kind permis- sion to reprint this article. Kitromilides whether at present, in the world of the early twenty-first century, we have entered a process leading away from the state-system established by Westphalia. This is certainly a difficult question that can only elicit controversial answers.
It will not be raised in what follows but some tentative responses to it may emerge, in an indirect way, from what will be said about the other two. These questions may appear embarrassingly broad and am- bitious, and their very formulation may sound—at least to the present author—presumptuous. What is not announced in the title, however, is the method by means of which I propose to approach them, and on this methodological basis, the whole project could perhaps be accorded the saving grace of historical realism and operational feasibility.
I have thought that it might not be impertinent to the sub- stantive issues I wish to address to attempt my answers to the two questions through a synopsis of the work I have devoted over almost four decades of research and reflection to the ques- tion of nationalism and its role in political and cultural change.
But a motive which weighs more with me [ Accordingly, in the spirit of the passage just quoted, I do not want to raise any claims of whatever nature for what I am going to outline below, except for its possible interest as an illustration in the sociology of knowledge. An Intellectual Trajectory The original motivation to turn to the study of nationalism, which developed into a lifelong engagement, derived from a study of electoral politics in Cyprus in the early s Kitro- milides, ; cf.
Loizos, , p. That work involved basic empirical research inspired by the models of electoral analysis elaborated by the Michigan school of survey research and by the classic approach of V. It was directed by a great political scientist, Fred Greenstein, who taught me at Wesleyan Universi- ty. From this research emerged the normative dominance of na- tionalist discourse in local politics, a dominance that overpow- ered and neutralized the basic sense of democratic politics: it set the limits of consensus and legitimacy beyond which dissent could not be tolerated.
For my youthful mind, this was a realiza- tion, both captivating and traumatic, because it placed question marks upon many of the accepted truths with which my gen- eration—and other generations before and after—had grown up and had been socialized in the political culture of Cyprus. It was by means of this basic empirical approach to political research that I came to appreciate the relevance of nationalism as a force in modern politics and the need to understand it as a ubiquitous and unrelenting factor shaping the context of po- litical choices and political decisions.
It was at this point that an important intellectual debt was incurred: a debt to Shlomo Avineri, who had taught me political theory at Wesleyan. Sh- lomo Avineri encouraged me to reflect upon the political sig- nificance and the political operation of the basic anthropological notions by reference to which I had attempted to interpret forms of electoral behavior.
Kitromilides that its explanatory power in political analysis was limited as it could be mostly operationalized as an interpretative tool in rural contexts and peasant communities. My debt to Shlomo Avineri was not a superficial one: it involved looking at the question of nationalism in political rather than anthropological terms and opened to me the exciting perspective of political theory upon actual political practice.
Even more substantively, this early intellectual debt meant putting the history of political ideas at the center of any inter- pretative approach to nationalism, which in turn meant taking the intellectual aspects of the phenomenon seriously rather than trivializing them as has been done in a considerable part of per- tinent writing by sociologists, anthropologists, and political sci- entists who for the most part work with a reductionist sense of the role and status of ideas in collective life.
Three Contexts The work on nationalism in the Eastern Mediterranean to be outlined in what follows can be considered on three levels, de- fined by successively broadened contextualizations: I Cyprus. The study of nationalism in Cyprus, if at all se- riously attempted, soon reveals that pertinent manifesta- tions since the nineteenth century were not intellectually autonomous phenomena; they depended to a considerable degree on the growth and expansion of Greek nationalism and the movement of national definition emanating from the Greek nation-state.
This is a very interesting phenom- enon of nation and state building through a process of exportation of ideas and normative discourse. This development proved abortive largely as a result of the propagation of a standard form of Modern Greek emanating from the Greek state and thus possessing the great normative au- thority that allowed it to be adopted as a formal medium primarily of written expression by communities geo- graphically ranging far afield and speaking widely diver- gent forms of the Greek language.
The phenomenon of the interplay of language and state and the story of the abortive development of multiple neo-Greek languages constitutes, I believe, one of the most interesting aspects of the history of the growth of Greek nationalism in the Eastern Mediterranean. It also possesses broader interest concerning the role of the state in language cultivation—which we tend to assume—but also in language destruction— which we tend to forget.
This development taught the Cypriots that they belonged to a wider ethnic and eventually na- tional community. Meanwhile, the cultural expansion of Greek nationalism reduced Cypriot Greek from a poten- tial language to the status of a dialect. Kitromilides A caveat is necessary at this point to avoid misunderstand- ings. The expansion and reception of Greek nationalism in contexts beyond that of its original inception was not an imposed process.
On the contraiy, it was a welcome and heartily adopted form of cultural mutation in Cyprus, in Asia Minor, in the Balkans, and elsewhere, a form of cultural change that brought to isolated, backward, and oppressed populations the promise of modernization and freedom.
It also provided a cognitive framework for mak- ing sense of their identity and their history and for visu- alizing their future. This explains the power and tenacity of nation- alism in Cyprus and elsewhere in the regions inhabited by unredeemed Greeks Kitromilides, , study no. For these populations, nationalism supplied a framework of social meaning, and it has been a grave error both of British colonial officials and historians but also subse- quently of anthropologists and political scientists to dis- miss it as an artificial externally imposed or concocted phenomenon.
Two factors make the Cyprus case interesting. First, the total success of the implantation of Greek nationalism, with the consequence of canceling out alternative pos- sibilities in the development of local collective identity, eventually leading up to collision with the group that was inevitably excluded from this course of development, the Muslim community in Cyprus. As a consequence, instead of becoming Cypriots, Muslims became politi- cally Turks, as the Orthodox Cypriots became politically Greeks.
British colonial policies in the period — encouraged this development through the employment of divide-and-rule tactics, so typical of British imperial administrative methods, or in any case, by the failure or programmatic unwillingness to encourage any form 50 Relevance or Irrelevance of Nationalism?
The second factor that makes the Cyprus case interest- ing is its tenacity and long-term survival, keeping a nine- teenth century irredentist political mentality alive into the twenty-first century. Hence, the problem of incongruity between the Cypriot liberation movement in the s and s and other anticolonial movements. The con- sequence of this was the failure of the liberation struggle to unite Cypriot society. II Greek nationalism. The realization that the main dynamic of Greek Cypriot nationalism was imported from Greece directs our interest to the study of Greek nationalism, its history and successive phases of growth.
Another major intellectual debt was incurred in this connection: a debt to Elie Kedourie, who could be considered, without risk- ing serious exaggeration, the founding father of the criti- cal study of nationalism in contemporary scholarship on account of his analysis of the political translation of the Kantian idea of self-determination into the distinctly Western doctrine of nationalism Kedourie Within the context of his research on the intellectual histoiy of nationalism, Kedourie discovered the significance of the political thought of Adamantios Korais, the great liberal political thinker of the early nineteenth century Kedourie , pp.
He encouraged me, at our first meeting in London in June , to look at the Enlighten- ment origins of Greek nationalism, and this became a life- long project of which I have not become tired or bored, 51 Paschalis M. Kitromilides mainly because the Greek Enlightenment has left us such an exciting literary heritage. There is one important aspect of Greek nationalism that I believe to be the major explanatory variable of its success in Greek society: it has over time been the central axis of the transition to modernity in Greek society and culture.
It has been in this sense the major force shaping modern politics, meaning democratic politics, the politics of mass society. This can explain its appeal, both within but also outside the Greek state, in the course of the nineteenth century. It was the promise of modernization, liberty, and justice that made nationalism such a powerful, indeed ir- resistible force in Greek politics.
III The Balkan context. Greek nationalism did not develop in a vacuum. As a historical phenomenon, it cannot be understood in isolation from its broader Balkan context. Reflecting upon and researching its expression and mani- festation in the wider Greek world of the nineteenth cen- tury, one inevitably comes to consider it to be a Balkan phenomenon, one of the multiple forms of the advent of modernity in Southeastern Europe and certainly the main one. Conflict on this third level, between secular nationalism and the Church, is a most interesting aspect of the prob- lem because it directs attention to the fundamental in- compatibility between religion and nationalism and to the 52 Relevance or Irrelevance of Nationalism?
Research on this topic has been per- haps the most exciting component of my preoccupation with nationalism over the years; it has offered the possi- bility to reconsider critically many conventional truths, to place question marks before many ideological certainties, and finally to draw distinctions that clarify the historicity of social and political experience.
A central preoccupa- tion of this critical perspective has been to question the identification of Orthodoxy with nationalism, an identifi- cation produced by the co-opting of religion, in this case Orthodoxy, into the ideological baggage of Balkan na- tion-states in the nineteenth century Kitromilides Orthodoxy, however, like all religions, is universalist in its outlook and values. It stands in stark contrast to the moral partiality of nationalism; national Orthodoxies constitute a political, not a religious construct, which in fact belies the ecumenical values of Christianity Kitromilides Meanings of Relevance What is absolutely clear I think from the historical case studies outlined above is that nationalism is a major force in modern history, certainly the major force in modern politics.
Competed again as Panthrakikos F. In that period, very few fans were take charge of administration. New era —present In Panagiotis Margaritis take charge of administration as chairman and Sakis Skoulis as manager. They were promoted two seasons in a row, reaching the Delta Ethniki in Kostas Vasilakakis, a former player of Panthrakikos, was hired as manager in the summer of In season —05 Panthrakikos were champions of Delta Ethniki and were again promoted, to the Gamma Ethniki.
A third-place finish in —06 saw them promoted once more, to the Beta Ethniki. Three managers were hired in the first half of the season Zisis Tsekos, Dimitrios Kalaitzidis and Yiannis Gounaris, were fired to be replaced by manager Kostas Vasilakakis and lead the club to an 11th-place finish. Panthrakikos started the —08 season with a breach of league rules in their opening game, against Chaidari, and were penalised by a four-point reduction. Despite this penalty, Panthrakikos beat Ilisiakos 1—0 in the final game of the season to overtake PAS Giannena, finish third and gain promotion to Super League Greece for the first time.
Emilio Ferrera, was hired as manager in the summer of , lead Panthrakikos to an 11th place finish in their first Super League season.
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