The only remaining attack he had to endure, was published in quite a different genre. In a thirty- page article in the monthly Le Flambeau January 31, , Pierre Nothomb, the ideological leader of Belgian annexationism, attributed the failure of Belgian diplomacy during the war and at the peace conference entirely to Beyens.
Cosmopolitan by birth and career, he would have been a leader among us, had he not been a stranger. What gives him the right to question my patriotism? To be of foreign origin, - which I am not, - does that make some of our politicians suspect of not passionately loving their country? Le Flambeau, April 30, Harbouring a different conception of patriotism, diplomats like Beyens did not accept the antithesis between cosmopolitanism and national belonging, convinced that their transna- tional networks allowed them to serve King and Country more effectively.
They refrained from engaging directly with the mass media, probably out of fear that their message would be distorted, or that it would result in an endless polemic. Personal letters of diplomats contain numerous references to the fear of Foreign Ministers and government leaders to provoke the ire of the mass press.
By the mids, they had gained public prestige and received almost exclusively positive media coverage. Readers now regularly encountered photographs of Belgian diplomats, often in full regalia and in the company of European leaders, covering part of the front page of their newspaper. Their uniforms and medals conferred them an aura of expertise, prestige and authority which must have greatly appealed to readers in the s. Le Soir, June 18, December 13 and 25, ; and May 18, Thus a close association between these men and the Belgian nation was created.
The appreciative articles about Belgian diplomats in the s lead us back to Davignon, who wondered why they received so much media attention. But their skill makes them appear as creators and magicians … They do not rely on overbidding, nor on intrigues, but on facts, on human experience, on reality.
And so, compared to ideo- logues and politicians, a prestige has descended upon them. Diplomats were executors par excellence. Part of public opinion might have been guided in this direction by the mass media, many of which lusted after scandals, especially when these involved politicians. By the s the most successful amongst them, the aforementioned ambassadors Count de Kerchove de Denterghem and Baron de Cartier de Marchienne, invested considerably in their relations with the mass press.
Especially after the First World War, journalists of the mass media circulated and rearticulated information about them in ways very different from the behind closed doors policy that diplomats were used to. This compelled them to manage and negotiate their mediatized personae. This does not mean that in the interwar years, many dip- lomats went along with mass media logics.
Diplomats were members of a transnational, aristocratic community, and thus, journalists argued, they were incapable of rightly serving the nation. Politicians were democratically elected, and thus better up to the task. Yet in the later interwar years the tides seem to have turned, as popular dailies expressed their disapproval of parliamentary politics, and politicians became the ones who did not serve the nation rightly.
They were now represented at the same time as part of the nation, and as in some way standing above the nation—as a kind of mys- terious, magical mediators. Their reticent attitude and the mystery that, as a conse- quence, surrounded them, had become a positive quality.
Notes 1. See Black, A History of Diplomacy, —9, —9, and —90 [the quote is on p. Van den Dungen, Milieu de presse, —3. The empirical material is drawn from chapters 5, 7, 9, 11, and the Epilogue of Auwers, The Island. This selection covers a wide range of political positions in Belgium and takes into account the newspapers most closely associated with the political and diplomatic elite.
For narrative purposes, I have quoted primarily from the party-politically neutral Le Soir, at the time the most widely read Belgian newspa- per. See Willequet, Documents, 37, 44, and Uit de Belgische archieven, 1. Auwers, The Island, — See Marks, Innocent Abroad. De Bens and Raeymaeckers, De Pers, For references to all these articles, see Auwers, The Island, Chapter 11 and especially Beyens to Marguerite Oppenheim, 13 July Henri Costermans to Van der Elst, April Costermans to Hymans, 9 April Beyens to Oppenheim, 12 July Hymans to Fallon, 27 March , P.
Girvin, The Right, 74—87; Gerard, De schaduw van het interbellum, — Ext , BFMA. References Alloul, Houssine, and Michael Auwers. Auwers, Michael. The Island and the Storm. Brussels: Peter Lang, Black, Jeremy. A History of Diplomacy. London: Reaktion Books.
Brommesson, Douglas, and Ann-Marie Ekengren. London: Palgrave. Coolsaet, Rik. Leuven: Van Halewyck. Dimensions of Structure and Process. Kunst in de Belgische ambassades. De Bens, Els, and Karin Raeymaeckers. Het verhaal van de Belgische Dagbladpers gisteren, vandaag en morgen. Tielt, Defoort, Erik. Delbecke, Bram. Ghent: Academia Press.
Entman, Robert. London: Routledge, Gendzel, Glenn. Gerard, Emmanuel. De schaduw van het interbellum. Tielt: Lannoo. Girvin, Brian. Why Retaliate? Zero-Sum Elections and Negativity Bias With respect to the theoretical foundation, the logic of retaliation appears to be so intuitive that its plausibility does not seem to require a great amount of justification.
Researchers often refer to common wisdom, the advice of political consultants Lau et al. Second, while negative campaigning is indeed often disliked, 1 mass media and voters are more likely to regard counterattacks as legitimate Krupnikov and Bauer To provide a more solid theoretical foundation, our argument builds on two premises. First, elections are zero-sum games.
All gains and losses in vote shares sum to zero. It is therefore the relative popularity of parties that counts. Second, negative messages weigh heavier in human information processing than positive ones. If attacks are believed to have a negative net effect on the target, the loss in relative popularity can only be made up for by retaliating against the attacker. The zero-sum logic obviously applies to two-party competition but is true even in multiparty systems.
What matters is thus not how voters evaluate parties in absolute terms but how parties stack up against each other. The vote-seeking imperative therefore dictates that parties try to maximize their support in the electorate relative to that of others. With respect to our second premise, many if not all politicians and strategists believe that negative messages have an effect on voter evaluations, which is disadvantageous for the target even though the direct evidence that negative campaigning yields a net benefit for the attacker is rather thin Lau and Pomper ; Lau et al.
However, even if political operatives believe that attacks are harmful for the target, why should they choose to respond in kind instead of compensating the assumed losses with positive messaging about their own party? We argue that the prime obstacle to choosing a positive response over retaliation lies in the asymmetric impact that negative and positive messages have on evaluative processes—a phenomenon denoted as negativity bias Rozin and Royzman As Ito et al.
Furthermore, negative messages are more influential than positive ones as they are more likely to be believed Hilbig Negativity bias also applies to political messaging Meffert et al. Given that the empirical material in our analysis comes from press releases, it is crucial to consider not only how voters will be influenced by party messages but also how the media may respond to campaign communication.
In competing for the attention of journalists, parties therefore have incentives to respond to negative messages about themselves with negative messages about their competitors. The increasing importance of direct communication through social media notwithstanding, most campaign communication is still delivered through traditional media channels. Political actors thus do not only have to consider voter responses when drafting messages, but they also have to anticipate the process of journalistic news selection and adapt their behavior to the media logic.
This suggests that parties and candidates who are attacked may not find themselves able to reverse the negative effect of that attack by focusing on positive messages about themselves. As bad weighs heavier than good in the minds of voters and journalists, the damage resulting from an attack can only be compensated by responding in kind. The most straightforward way to offset the damage is to inflict a similar cost on the political opponent.
Responding to an attack with a counterattack thus emerges as the dominant strategy. This is our first hypothesis: Hypothesis 1 H1 : An attack from party A on party B raises the probability of a counterattack from party B on party A. This logic of retaliation is perfectly suited for two-party races and elections following a winner-takes-all logic. Multiparty races with PR, by contrast, might follow a different logic.
Here, our understanding of negative campaigning remains limited as the existing studies focus mostly on the United States. Notwithstanding the importance of U. This clearly applies to studies dealing with retaliation in two-party races such as elections to the U. Moving to Multiparty Competition Research on negative campaigning in European multiparty competition has so far not addressed the dynamics of campaign interactions.
The only exception is the study of de Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis who find no evidence that Dutch politicians directly respond to attacks with counterattacks. Rather, political actors attack the allies of their attackers, but this result may in part be due to the fact that the study does not aggregate individuals into parties.
As argued above, the zero-sum logic also applies to multiparty competition, and the logic of retaliation H1 might be dominant even in such races. Yet there are several important reasons why direct retaliation against the sender may not always be the most preferred option for the targeted party in multiparty systems.
First, there is often a stark asymmetry in size between sender and target. Rather than merely absorbing the hits from smaller parties, larger parties may choose to react by attacking their main rivals to compensate the relative losses that they have incurred from being attacked.
Second, elections typically produce minority situations that necessitate the formation of a coalition government. For example, if one right-wing party attacks another, retaliation may produce some intra-bloc voter exchange without expanding the overall prospects of a right-wing majority. The better strategy may be to react to attacks by attacking those rivals from which voters need to be drawn to produce the preferred coalition.
Third, a party may react to attacks by targeting whichever party it sees as its main competitor based on current poll ratings. Skaperdas and Grofman , for instance, predict that parties in three-way competition never attack the weaker of their two opponents—this formal model assumes single-member districts, though. Still, even in multiparty PR systems, it may be rational for the runner-up to always attack the leading party e.
However, similar reasoning applies to smaller parties, as coming in just ahead of a competitor may make a significant difference in terms of postelection bargaining power. A specific characteristic of multiparty competition is heightened competition for media attention. Given time and space constraints, it is more difficult to cover the policy statements and campaign messages of seven parties than of two.
In instances where—for whatever reason—direct retaliation is not the preferred option, this makes reacting to attacks with positive issue or valence messages an unattractive option, as such messages are even less likely to prevail than they would be under two-party competition. The best reaction in such cases is then to attack a third party, as such a message will be of higher news value. These arguments illustrate that attacks need not always trigger retaliation but can sometimes lead the targeted party to direct negative messages toward a third actor.
Attacks by one party against another may simply lead the attacked party to reinforce its strategy of attacking whichever competitor they have singled out as their preferred target anyway. While one may object that it is difficult to ascertain in such instances whether it was the first attack that caused the second, we rely on extremely close temporal sequence and thousands of observations to examine whether the correlations in attack patterns conform to our assumptions.
To illustrate our theorizing more clearly, consider a party system with five parties A to E. This type of interaction is captured by the two hypotheses below. H2a outlines the scenario in which party A always prefers to attack B and therefore reacts to attacks by other parties by targeting B.
Under H2b, party A prefers to ignore attacks from B and reacts by attacking some other party. Hypothesis 2b H2b : An attack on party A by party B increases the probability of an attack of A on parties other than B. Empirical Strategy Case Selection This study focuses on Austria, a typical West European parliamentary democracy with a PR electoral system, multiparty politics, coalition governments, and a democratic-corporatist media system Hallin and Mancini ; Plasser and Lengauer While negative campaigning has been an important feature of elections throughout the postwar period, systematic studies are mostly missing see Dolezal et al.
In the present paper, we analyze three of the most recent general elections , , and As a general pattern, Austrian parties act very cohesively and do not make public their coalition preferences before the election but sometimes commit not to form particular coalitions e. We also need the exact timing of party messages to infer patterns of attacks and counterattacks empirically—information not all sources provide. While common as a data source in agenda-setting studies Brandenburg ; Tedesco , press releases have hardly been used to analyze negative campaigning.
This is an obvious but important advantage compared with other modes of communication used by scholars so far. The analysis of media reports, for instance, does not capture party behavior directly but observes what journalists write about it Elmelund-Praestekaer and Molgaard-Svensson ; Hansen and Pedersen
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